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Abstract
The aim of the article is to prove  that companies cooperate not only because they wish to, but also 
because they are forced to do it. Moreover, It turns out that sometimes firms cooperate in strategic 
alliances with partners which were not selected, but appeared coincidentally. The article identifies 
market and law circumstances which  especially force companies to cooperate. In addition to this, 
it gives the examples of how strategic alliances are formed by coincidentally matched companies. It 
tries to estimate how these negative circumstances influence the performance of cooperation. The 
findings base on case studies, which were mainly prepared from the interviews with the manage-
ment of firms. The main conclusion of the article is that both compulsory and coincidental coopera-
tion is usually successful, especially when firms have strong motivation to maintain cooperation, 
can limit their opportunism and are able to show some understanding to the difficult position, in 
which they found themselves.  
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1. Introduction
About twenty years ago T. Peters stated: ”In the nineteen nineties the concept of 
fully independent corporation will be replaced by the concept of corporations 
involved in cooperation” (Peters, 1992). This statement turned out to suit the 
economic reality of that time very well and seems to be still valid. That is also the 
reason why there has been a lot of interest in the field of cooperation for so long. 
The phrase ‘cooperation of enterprises” is commonly associated with sharing 
costs, risks and benefits. Enterprises involved in a cooperative venture are named 
partners, allies or simply collaborators in the most basic form of non-equity 
cooperation. Trust among partners seems to be something natural, its source can 
be usually found in former relationships between companies. Equity joint ventures 
(JV) are often even described as “marriages”. However, this idyllic vision, which 
has just been presented, is often very different from reality. Competitors are often 
forced to cooperate by external factors. Furthermore, even strategic alliances are 
sometimes established by firms which are not willing to cooperate with each 
other, but coincidence makes them do it. The aim of this article is to find the 
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reasons for these odd situations as well as to estimate how they influence the 
performance of JV. The research method applied are case studies, which are based 
on the interviews with the senior managers of JVs, conducted by the Author in 
2009 and 2010.
2. Compulsory cooperation
If a company decides to start the cooperation, it usually can choose the most 
suitable partner in the selection process. This decision is the most important in 
the initiation phase, because, as some previous research indicates, finding a good 
partner is one of a few key success factors of IJV (Geringer 1991, Townsend 
2003). In order to find the best partner, many features of the candidates will be 
taken into consideration. If a company seeks a partner for a non-equity cooperative 
venture, the most crucial selection criteria will be price, quality, reliability, former 
relationships etc. Equity cooperation, which usually takes the form of a JV, also 
begins with the same selection process. However, in this case the crucial selection 
criteria will be to what extent the firms share the same vision and aims and how 
well their strategies are matched (Triantis 1999). The alliance formed in this way 
can be called a classical marriage. Nevertheless, specific law or market factors 
can force a company to create a cooperative venture without the partner selection 
process, which has just been mentioned. This situation can lead to cooperation 
among even fierce competitors. This type of relationship can be called “marriage 
without love”. The fact that the relation is compulsory is likely to have negative 
influence on the performance of the venture, due to the lack of common vision 
and aims among partners. According to P. Jagersma (2005), the lack of these two 
things is the most powerful factor out of ten negative factors concerning strategic 
alliances, which he lists. Circumstances leading to “marriages without love” can 
be divided into two categories:
a) market,
b) law.
Market circumstances are the effect of monopoly or oligopoly. In these 
particular situations the only partner to cooperate is a monopoly or members of 
an oligopoly. Case 1 presents this situation. 
Case 1. Market circumstances leading to non-equity cooperation: Building the 
GSM transmitters network in Poland.
Till 2007 there were only three mobile network operators in Poland: PTK Centertel, 
Polkomtel and Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa. These firms have been developing their 
transmitter networks, which is very time-consuming and expensive Despite the fact, 
that the operators were fierce competitors, they decided to cooperate in this area. 
The cooperation consists in installing transmitters of more than one operator on one 





this field. It was impossible to find a different partner for this purpose, simply leaving 
these firms with no choice. On the other hand, the refusal of participation in this 
cooperative venture would mean higher costs and slower development of the network. 
What is more, the common creation of a network has built a large entrance barrier for 
telecommunication competitors.
Source: own work
Market circumstances can also lead to equity cooperation. This situation 
presents case 2. 
Case 2. Market circumstances leading to equity cooperation. The establishment 
of Kemipol.
Transnational corporation Kemira Kemi AB decided to build a plant in order to 
produce PIX. PIX is an aqueous solution of iron (III) sulfide. The resource needed 
for the production is iron (II) sulfide, and its only producer in Poland being Zakłady 
Chemiczne Police S.A. There was no alternative partner for Kemira Kemi in the Polish 
market to create a joint venture. The plant started operating in 1991 r. and it is still in 
operation. The CEO of Kemipol describes the cooperation as harmonic.
Source: own work
Law circumstances, which force companies to cooperate, may be indirectly 
the effect of monopoly or oligopoly. Market regulators attempt to promote and 
strengthen competition in the market and their decisions force a monopoly or 
members of an oligopoly to cooperate. This situation presents case 3. However, 
there is one more reason why firms cooperate due to law circumstances. 
Governments sometimes attempt to force firms to cooperate in order to gain 
additional advantages for the economy. Case 4 presents this type of situation.
Case 3. Law circumstances leading to non-equity cooperation. Telekomunikacja 
Polska S.A. and Netia S.A.
Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. (TP S.A.) is the operator of the nationwide tele-
communication network and, at the same time, provider of telecommunication 
services. TP S.A. used to be a monopoly and being the owner of the network gives it 
greater advantage over the rest of the competitors. In order to provide access to the 
network for other firms, the market regulator forced TP S.A. to lease its network and 
established a  maximum price for the lease. It means, that TP S.A. has to cooperate 
with Netia S.A., its competitor, although it is totally against its will and brings more 
disadvantages than profits.
Source: Decision of Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej, 3 June 2008 r., entitled: „Opis 
kalkulacji zorientowanych przyszłościowo w pełni alokowanych kosztów detalicznej usługi za-
pewnienia części lub całości minimalnego zestawu łączy dzierżawionych o przepływnościach 





Case 4. Law circumstances leading to equity cooperation. Limitations on foreign 
direct investments (FDI).
Sometimes firms are allowed to enter the market only in cooperation with a local 
partner, because it is assumed, that this cooperation will have a positive effect on the 
economy, e.g. it will stimulate technology transfer or generate new skills. Involvement 
of a local partner in a foreign venture also allows better control over it from the host 
country. This usually occurs in developing countries, which are slowly, step by step, 
liberalizing the access to their markets. This situation occurred in Poland in the last 
years of socialism as a result of a special law, which partially allowed foreign firms 
to enter the Polish market. Similar law existed in China till 1986. These limitations 
force the investor to find a local partner for the venture and cause great inconvenience. 
The investor has to search for a reliable local partner which is often difficult due to 
limited information available on local firms. Moreover, there is also a threat to the 
intellectual property loss. In the worst case this might lead to breeding a competitor in 
the market. That is why this kind of limitations on FDI strongly discourages investors 
from entering the market. Usually they are removed after a few years to stimulate 
FDI.
Source: Dz. U. 1986r., nr 17, poz. 88; W. Tseng, H. Zebregs, Foreign Direct Investment in 
China: Some lessons for other countries, Policy Discussion Paper 02/3, International Monetary 
Fund 2002 r., s. 6.
It is definitely worth considering how compulsory cooperation (which can be 
described as a “marriage without love”) is managed, which differs from managing 
traditional cooperation. There is one useful tool, which undoubtedly simplifies 
management. It is a contract between partners, which precisely describes rights 
and duties of both sides. It may also include the procedure of problem solving in 
case of a conflict between partners. In cases of limited trust and the lack of positive 
attitude, a well-constructed, detailed contract between partners would reduce 
conflicts. If market circumstances, are to be blame for compulsory cooperation, 
partners still have to be motivated for good work, because they generally profit 
from it. However, it is worth considering the case of a monopoly, which is forced 
to cooperate with a competitor by a market regulator. The monopoly does not 
have motivation to cooperate and will try to act against its partner. Although 
the cooperation bases on the contract and both sides are obliged to fulfil it, the 
monopoly can cooperate in the worst possible way without breaking the rules 
of the contract. For example, if there is a breakdown of a telecommunication 
service on the TP S.A.’s line, which is leased to Netia S.A., TP S.A. will repair 
it in the longest possible time, causing the client to blame Netia S.A. for the 
inconvenience. This is a form of discrediting Netia S.A.’s reliability. It is easy 
to show other  examples of such practices, they can be easily found in all areas, 
where monopolies and oligopolies occur. In Poland they exist in the postal services 






In the cases described above the companies might not start the cooperation, 
although it usually means either higher costs, or exclusion from entering a new 
market. It is still their decision to proceed. The only exception is a monopoly, 
which is forced to cooperate by law. However, there is one more way in which 
firms are matched to form a cooperative venture, by coincidence. This situation 
is not surprising if it concerns non-equity cooperation. For example, in order 
to build a skyscraper, the investor has to deal with many building constructors, 
which are responsible for different installations and equipment. It is up to them to 
cooperate in the construction yard in a way to avoid disturbing each other, but they 
do not choose who they encounter or who their partner becomes. Coincidental 
cooperation may as well happen in strategic alliances, especially in JV. This is the 
result of ownership changes of the JV’s parent companies. Figure 1 shows how 
this process happens. Companies A and B form a JV ab. Company C acquires 
company B and becomes a partner in ab. Case 5 presents this situation.
Figure 1. Emergence of a new partner in a JV as an effect of the acquisition of a previous partner 
Source: own work. 
Case 5. Acquisition of a partner of Ecol-Unicon (former Ekol-Unicon) 
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Case 5. Acquisition of a partner of Ecol-Unicon (former Ekol-Unicon)
Ecol-Unicon is a JV established in 1996 by Ekol (Poland) and Unicon (Denmark) in 
order to manufacture facilities for water refinery. Ekol held 51% and Unicon 49% of 
shares. In 2004 Unicon, which was a part of FLS group, was sold and absorbed by 
the Italian group Cementir SpA. It is necessary to mention, that Ekol was a much 
smaller company than Unicon. For Cementir SpA its JV with a Polish firm emerged 
to be of little significance for two reasons: first of all, Ecol-Unicon is a tiny part 
of the Italian group, secondly, its activity is far from core business of the Italians, 
which is the production of concrete and cement. On the other hand, for Polish side, 
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the cooperation with Unicon became the most important venture and Ecol-Unicon 
outgrew its parent company Ekol. In a situation like this it seems to be a natural move 
for a Polish company to buy the shares in the venture owed by the Italian partner. This 
has not happened yet, because, despite the negotiations, the partners did not reach an 
agreement on the price. As far as the management of the venture is concerned, the 
Italians are passive and do not show much interest in it. The Polish side is allowed to 
fully run the JV, which it successfully does. 
Source: own work
Equity cooperation of coincidentally-matched firms can also be the effect of 
the sale of JV shares to a third-party. This situation is shown in the Figure 2. 
Companies A and B establish a JV ab. Company C buys B’s shares and becomes 
the partner in ab.
  
Emergence of a new partner in a JV brings many threats for the current 
partner. First of all, this might be the wish to liquidate the venture. This can 
be done in two ways: by buying out the partner’s stake or by the sale of its own 
one. In the first case the current partner gets the opportunity to gain full control 
over the venture. However, if the partners do not agree on the price, a third party 
can acquire the stake. Secondly, a new partner can decide to be passive. This 
attitude towards the venture might be favourable (as it was in case 5). However, 
passiveness also means not supporting the venture. For Ecol-Unicon (case 5) the 
acquisition of a parent company Unicon was not a big threat, because Ecol-Unicon 
has already become a fully independent, well-developed unit. Unicon was neither 
the important customer, nor the supplier of the JV. The transfer of key Unicon’s 
technology to the JV had taken place before the acquisition of Unicon. If a new 
partner decides to actively participate in managing its JV, the cooperation makes 
Figure 2. 
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Source: own work.
Figure 2. Emergence of a new partner in a JV as an effect of the sale of the shares by a previous partner 
   
Source: own work. 
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sense if both parties do not go beyond the borders of the partner’s tolerance. 
Conflicts are inevitable, because companies matched in this way are unlikely to 
share the same vision and aims and have complementary resources. However, if 
they are able to show some understanding in a difficult situation , in which they 
encountered and remain open and flexible, the cooperation brings positive effects. 
Case 6 shows the situation like this.
Case 6. El-Centrum (currently Elektroskandia Polska S.A.)
In 1993 two Polish companies: Elektrim and  Elektromontaż-Export S.A. established 
El-Centrum. The main aim of the JV was distribution of electric appliances. Parent 
companies had equal stakes in the venture. In 2000 the ownership changes occurred. 
A Dutch company Hagemeyer N.V. bought the shares owned by Elektromontaż- 
-Export S.A. and was willing to buy Elektrim’s shares too. Electrim was selling its 
stake in El-Centrum, but in a group of seven companies of different trades. Some of 
them more, some less attractive. Hagemeyer did not want to buy seven companies. The 
group was finally bought by a Belgian company GEPC Belgium. Hagemeyer offered 
to buy the Belgian shares in El-Centrum, but its offer was rejected, because GEPC 
Belgium decided to use El-Centrum as a distribution channel for of its products. The 
conflicts among partners were inevitable due to different visions of the venture, one 
being development. The Belgians opted for organic growth, Hagemeyer wanted to 
support organic growth with acquisitions. Nevertheless, the coincidentally-matched 
partners never did anything that would have been totally unacceptable for the second 
partner, for example the profit was never transferred to parent companies and was 
used for development. Hagemeyer’s intention to gain full control over the venture was 
realized in 2006, when GEPC finally sold its stake.
Source: own work.
In both presented case studies coincidentally-matched firms can cooperate 
quite successfully, which is an optimistic finding. It seems that this is the result 
of the fact, that both parties of the venture are aware of the stalemate situation, 
in which they are involved. Neither party is willing to resign or counts on the 
partner’s resignation. It is necessary to mention, that in case 5 the new partner 
has a weak position in the JV due to ownership of only 49% shares, therefore it 
is impossible for it to impose any decisions. It is likely that the Italian part would 
sell its stake in Ecol-Unicon, but  the JV has been growing rapidly (sales growth 
30% in 2007 in relation to 2006), therefore the value of its shares has been 
constantly increasing. In case 6 companies had equal stakes in their JV, but they 
reached a compromise in key issues. In both cases the JVs were independent 
units and parent companies were unable to influence them in any other way. If 





key client or supplier, the situation would look much different. Case 7 shows a 
JV like that.
Case 7. Dendro Poland
Dendro Poland is a JV of two Swedish companies, each of them holds 50% of shares. 
One of the parent companies is IKEA. Dendro Poland’s one and only aim is to 
manufacture mattresses for the Swedish giant. Despite the fact, that IKEA has only 
50% of the shares, being the only client provides this firm with a stronger position. 
Taking  into consideration that the whole production of Dendro Poland is absorbed 
by IKEA, the existence of the JV depends on the Swedish giant.
Source: own work
A new parent in a JV usually has some plans for it. How much a new parent is 
able to achieve depends on its power and the business relationship between it and 
its JV. It is necessary to mention, that even if a company is a minor shareholder 
in a JV, a well-constructed contract, which, for example, requires unanimity in 
strategic decisions, allows it to have some influence on the management. One 
more key factor, which determines the attitude of a new parent towards its JV is 
the relation between its and JV’s trade. If a new parent’s business is far from JV’s 
trade, it is discouraging to actively participate in management, due to the lack of 
experience, especially when a current partner manages the venture successfully. 
In that case passiveness means, being reasonable, not a weakness. There can 
be many factors, which affect the new parent’s intentions, for example strong 
competition between it and the second shareholder or a strong wish to introduce 
significant changes in order to bring the JV in line with the strategy of the group. 
Nevertheless, nothing can be fully and successfully done without the approbation 
of the ally.
4. Conclusion
Managing of a cooperative venture is difficult, especially when partners are not 
matched voluntarily. Nevertheless, as the presented cases show, both coincidental 
and compulsory cooperation can have positive effects. This is because the vision 
of  common profits dominates over differences among partners. Moreover, after 
a period of partially successful cooperation, partners learn much about each 
other and some trust arises, which is so important in doing business. To sum up, 
both coincidental and compulsory cooperation seem to be usually successful, on 
condition partners have strong motivation to work together, are able to limit their 
opportunism and can show some understanding to the difficult position, in which 
they found themselves. The article partially concerns the instability of equity 





because the ownership changes seem to occur in strategic alliances surprisingly 
often. What is more, a bankruptcy of a JV’s partner and its negative effects on the 
JV are other interesting areas of research, especially in the context of methods to 
protect against them.      
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